Using a sample of 293 purchases of stock in publicly traded companies by governments or state-owned investors from 43 countries over 1990-2010, we investigate the impact of government share ownership on the cost of corporate bond debt. Government stock ownership might lead to a higher cost of debt by providing an implicit state guarantee that increases moral hazard for corporate managers, by reducing the threat of disciplinary replacement of current managers, by eliminating hostile takeover threats and minimizing the risk of bankruptcy, and/or by imposing social and political goals that reduce corporate profitability and thus increase default risk. On the other hand, government ownership might bring an implicit debt guarantee that will reduce the cost of corporate debt. Our results strongly support the notion that the dominant effect is a reduction in the cost of debt due to an implicit guarantee. In the multivariate analysis, while government presence overall does not have a significant impact, state ownership is associated with lower spreads during the 2008-10 Financial Crisis, in the presence of high leverage, and for highyield bonds. In other words, in times of economic recession or firm distress, the value of the implicit debt guarantee is revealed, and government ownership leads to a lower cost of funding. Further, we find that the effect is specific to domestic government ownership, again consistent with the notion that the main channel of impact is an implicit debt guarantee. Further, we document that the impact of government ownership differs by type of government entity.
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So what motivates governments to purchase stock in private, listed companies-and how do private investors value the stocks and bonds of companies in which governments invest? Besides the aforementioned studies examining cross-border investments by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and SOEs, there has been surprisingly little scholarly research into these questions, but several popular rationales for state investment in listed equity have been put forth.
3 Governments might buy stock to influence companies to maintain high levels of employment, or they might wish to subsidize industries considered vital to the nation's social and military goals. Equally plausibly, governments might wish to inject equity capital into a private firm through a stock purchase in order to protect it from financial distress or rescue it from bankruptcy. All of these motivations suggest that governments will be very reluctant to allow a company in which they purchase stock to fail, and so investors will come to expect that governments will likely honor the debt obligations of struggling government-owned firms, thus providing a sort of implicit debt guarantee [Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) ; Brown and Dinç (2009) ; Borisova and Megginson (2011)] . Such a government guarantee on the debt of investment targets is likely to be more valuable during times of economic hardship, as defaults are, all else equal, more likely during recessions [Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) , Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011), Santos (2011) ]. Even then, however, extending such a guarantee could also impose significant costs on the target firm and/or its competitors [Laeven and Levine (2008) ; Gropp, Kakenes, and Schnabel (2011) .
In a similar fashion, implicit government guarantees are likely to be strongest for domestic targets, as a default of a foreign investment target is less likely to carry the political stigma associated with domestic failures of state-owned companies. Further, social and political goals are less likely to be imposed on foreign targets, as employment level maximization in a foreign country is unlikely to be a goal imposed by a government owner on a foreign firm. Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo and Park (1993) warn that this reluctance of governments to allow firms to fail (especially financial institutions) is likely to increase managerial moral hazard, as shareholders and managers enjoy the benefits of strong firm performance, while the government and, ultimately, the taxpayers will likely share the costs of insolvency. Such moral hazard is further strengthened by a lower risk of a manager losing his/her job, as government-owned firms are less likely to be acquired in a takeover or be allowed to go bankrupt. This moral hazard problem is also exacerbated by a monitoring gap which is likely to be associated with government ownership, as shown, for example, by Bortolotti, Fotak and Megginson (2010) for SWF investments. Governments typically provide lower levels of monitoring than other private shareholders.
In addition, government ownership might lead to the imposition of social and political priorities on 3 An intriguing recent analysis of the motivations underlying the opposite phenomenon-the determinants of governments' desire to nationalize private (petroleum) assets--is presented in Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin (2009). 4 investment targets, which could lead to deviations from purely economic shareholder value maximization.
Such deviations are likely to negatively impact firm performance and firm value, which in turn will lead to a higher probability of default and a higher cost of debt.
Evidence on the impact of the cost of debt of government ownership has been investigated recently by Borisova and Megginson (2011) . Our research differs from their analysis in several ways, most importantly in that they examine only privatizations. While such a sample offers clear insight into the impact of decreases of government ownership on the cost of debt-they find that decreasing state ownership increases bond spreads for partially privatized companies, but that the cost of debt falls once a company is fully privatized--our analysis allows for a cleaner test of the impact of a change in government ownership.
Past research has also documented that not all institutional investors are good monitors and that the monitoring is best-perhaps only-provided by independent, long-term investors [Borokovich, Bunarski, Harman and Parrino (2006) ; Chen, Harford and Li (2007) ; Ferreira and Matos (2008) than do pure government entities or state-owned operating companies [Woidtke (2002) ; Gianetti and Laeven (2009) ; Bortolotti, et al (2010); and Jiang, Lee, Yue (2010) ]. An activist stance by the acquiring state entities could either mitigate or amplify the adverse impact of government-induced moral hazard.
Further, the strength of the implicit debt guarantee should be especially strong for domestic state investors, which would reduce the cost of debt ceteris paribus, and recent empirical studies show that local investors are better able to overcome informational asymmetries than are more distant investors [Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010) ; Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and Uysal (2010) ]. On the other hand, even more empirical evidence points to the superiority of foreign institutional and corporate investors as monitors of investee-firm managements, which could lead to higher firm valuations and thus a reduced cost of debt [Djankov and Murrell (2002); Brown, Earle, Telegdy (2006 Ferreira and Matos (2008) ]. Clearly, we should expect different types of government entities to impact the cost of debt of investee firms in materially different ways.
The net impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of a firm is, therefore, a matter of empirical investigation, and we examine the link between government ownership and spreads (above This study is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 2 describes data sources, sample construction, and variable definitions and offers descriptive statistics and univariate tests. Section 3 discusses the methodology, panel regressions, and the associated model estimation results. Section 4 focuses on planned robustness tests and discusses possible extensions, while Section 5 concludes. 6
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Governments, as acquirers, differ from private entities in multiple ways. Most importantly, government ownership carries an implicit--and, sometimes, explicit--guarantee on the debt of the firm, as it is unlikely that a firm with state ownership will be allowed to default on its debt. This unwillingness of governments to allow firms to default is due to three main reasons. First of all, there are political goals to keep unemployment low, which is not consistent with the loss of jobs frequently associated with the default of a firm. Second, government ownership is often motivated by the desire to maintain key industries providing crucial services to the country; accordingly, governments are not keen on allowing such strategic holdings to default. Finally, politicians do not wish to be associated with a failed investment and will thus pressure the government to rescue an insolvent government-owned firm. Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) find that politically connected firms are more likely to be recipients of government bailouts, while Brown and Dinç (2005) present evidence that defaults of government-owned banks are less common than defaults of privately owned banks. As governments are unlikely to let a government-owned firm default, debt-holders might perceive that the probability of default is reduced as governments will back the debt of the firm. Since government guarantees extend directly to the debt of the firm, we might expect that state ownership would lower the debt pricing for target firms. However, Borisova and Megginson (2011) show that state influence on debt pricing can be non-monotonic, and several factors resulting from state presence could raise the firms' cost of debt financing.
First, as discussed by Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo and Park (1993) , this implicit government guarantee allows shareholders and managers to benefit from strong firm performance, while public funds are used to keep firms afloat during difficult periods. Consequently, we expect managers to increase levels of risk taking, which in turn is likely to increase the cost of debt of the government-owned firm.
Second, this moral hazard problem might be reinforced by a monitoring gap that might occur because the government is unable, or unwilling, to supervise management. Since bondholders expect governments to rescue distressed firms, their own incentives to monitor the actions of management decrease (OECD, 1998 Using similar reasoning regarding the importance of an implicit government guarantee during times of overall market distress, we investigate whether this guarantee would also be more valuable during times of firm-specific distress, when access to capital markets is constrained and defaults are more likely. We look at the influence of government ownership on the cost of debt in target firms at different levels of leverage and also examine the effect of government ownership on the cost of high yield bonds.
Therefore, we use higher leverage and lower credit ratings as proxies for firm specific distress and hypothesize that: Past research has documented that not all institutional investors are good monitors and that the best monitoring is provided by independent, long-term investors [Li, Harford and Chen (2007) ].
Government-owned entities similarly differ in terms of objectives and modus operandi. Some classes of government entities are more likely to be closely involved in the management and monitoring of their acquisition targets. An activist stance by the acquiring entities could mitigate the adverse impact of government-induced moral hazard. Similarly, the strength of the implicit debt guarantee differs according to the nature of the government entity holding the investment stake, in turn leading to different impacts on the cost of debt. Accordingly, we investigate whether different classes of government-owned acquirers (central government, state-owned banks, state-owned enterprises, public pension funds, etc.) have different impacts on the cost of debt of investment targets.
H4: The impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment targets differs according to the type of government investment vehicle.
Government guarantees are strongest for domestic targets, as the default of a foreign investment target is less likely to carry the political stigma associated with domestic failures of state-owned companies. Also, active involvement of a foreign government in a domestic target can and usually is met with significant public opposition, so governments may sometimes choose to be passive investors, especially in their foreign holdings. This reduced monitoring can lead to increased risk taking, reduced firm efficiency and, therefore, a higher cost of debt. This analysis suggests a lower cost of debt for domestic investments due to the reduced monitoring role of governments in their foreign investments because of public opposition. On the other hand, government involvement could lead to the higher cost of debt for domestic entities as those investments typically pursue not only shareholder value maximization, but also other political and social goals. Bortolotti, Fotak and Megginson (2010) document that social and political goals are less likely to be imposed on foreign targets, as foreign acquisitions tend to be largely driven by economic rationale. Thus, we hypothesize:
The impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment targets will differ for domestic firms.
Sample Description
We collect a sample of government investments from the Securities Data Company (SDC)
Platinum ‗Mergers and Acquisitions' database. As an initial screen, we include all investments by entities whose ultimate parent is flagged as ‗government' over the years 1990-2010. This initial search yields a total of 2,517 government investment deals involving 1,953 unique target firms. We further rely on SDC to collect additional information about the deals, such as announcement and completion dates, the percentage of shares acquired for each deal, the percentage of shares held by the acquirer after the deal, the nation of the acquirer, and the nation and primary SIC code of the target. This sample is restricted to government investments in publicly traded firms, so that we can obtain audited accounting data for the investment targets.
We use the SDC ‗New Issues' database to identify target firms based on CUSIP identifiers with publicly traded ‗plain vanilla' bonds outstanding over the period 1990-2010. Following Borisova and
Megginson (2011), we only use straight bonds with fixed coupons as the spreads of debt securities with additional features are driven more by sovereign bond yield fluctuations (Duffee, 1998 To perform our analysis, historical accounting data for the bond-issuing firm are also required.
We search for relevant financial data using Worldscope and are able to collect necessary measures for a final dataset of 218 firms. These firms are targets of 293 government purchases, and have 1,291 sample bonds outstanding that meet our selection criteria, thus yielding 5,176 bond-year observations. We further augment this dataset by using additional sources to verify and track government ownership over time in the target assets. We use SDC to track sales by the same acquirer-target pair in order to capture decreases in stakes. Similarly, we use SDC to obtain data on possible privatizations of acquirers, as these would affect the ultimate government stake in the transaction target.
Descriptive Statistics
We provide a first insight into the composition of our sample by analyzing the government investment transactions included in our final dataset. The sample includes a total of 293 government purchase transactions, valued at US$ 339 billion. Core descriptive information is presented in multiple panels in Table 1 
Variables
Our main analysis is based on panel regressions, with yield spreads as response variables and proxies for the cost of debt. The variables used in this analysis are described in Table 2 . Descriptive statistics relevant to the main variables are included in Table 3 .
The presence and level of government investment in target firms serve as our primary explanatory factors of interest. Govt presence is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there is any government ownership in the firm, and 0 otherwise, and we also collect levels of state ownership represented as a percentage of a firm's shares. As presented in Table 3 , out of a total of 5,176 bond-years, 3,668 (71%) involve the presence of government. Mean government ownership is 13.64% for the overall sample, but it increases to 19.25% for the sample of bond-years in which government is present as a shareholder.
To account for foreign governments investing in our target firms, a Foreign govt investor indicator is included, as this type of state ownership could yield different effects on the cost of debt of target firms. Foreign government ownership accounts for 1,423 observations, which is 28% of the overall sample and 39% of the sample with state ownership. Also, because the recent financial crisis has spurred large waves of government intervention, we also include a financial crisis indicator taking a value of one when credit spreads are measured in the period 2008-2010 and find that; 1,841 of the observations (36% of the overall sample) span the financial crisis period. As a first control variable, we include S&P credit ratings obtained from Datastream. We form an ordinal scale with the best credit quality assigned the highest number, and we use the natural logarithm of credit rating to account for possible nonlinearity. The expected sign of the coefficient on the credit rating is negative -the higher the credit rating, the lower the spread. The median credit rating in our sample corresponds to an S&P rating of -A-‖.
The number of days to maturity is also included in our models, with an expected positive coefficient due to more uncertainty over the lifetime of the bond. Average time to maturity in our sample is about 2800 days, or 7.7 years. We also control for the bond's age, defined as the number of days between the issue date and the date on which the spread was collected; average bond age in our sample is 1639 days, or approximately 4.5 years. Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005) document the age of the bond as one of the most important determinants of bond market liquidity. We expect a negative relation between bond age and credit spreads, as in Borisova and Megginson (2011) , since as the bond's maturity date approaches there is less uncertainty associated with its coupon and par value payments.
Banks and other financial institutions are often treated separately in empirical analysis as their capital structures are typically different from those of other firms and because they generally enjoy higher levels of government support in case of distress. We accordingly define an indicator variable identifying banking firms based on the firm's industry classification, name, and business description, and we expect this variable to be negatively associated with firms' cost of debt. Over one-fourth of all target firm observations [1,300 of 5,176 total firm-years observations] are for investments in commercial banks.
We further include controls for firm leverage (computed as total assets minus equity, divided by equity) to serve as a proxy for the probability of default. Including firm leverage as a control variable also allows us to account for the impact of deleveraging associated with capital injections. We expect firms with higher leverage to have a higher cost of debt, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) . We also include the market-to-book ratio (with an average of 1.89) and size (proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, with a mean of 10.93), as both have been shown by Fama and French (1993) to explain variation in bond returns. Larger firms are generally considered safer, at least partially due to increased asset diversification; hence, we expect a negative relationship between firm size and cost of debt. Market-to-book is generally viewed as a proxy for the growth prospects of the company, so we expect higher growth opportunities to be associated with more ease of debt repayment, and, hence, a lower cost of debt. Finally, we include return-on-equity (with a mean of 7.49%), which Crabbe and Fabozzi (2002) document being associated with ease of debt repayment. Accordingly, we expect return-on-equity to be negatively associated with the cost of debt.
Further, we obtain collateral and instrument types from Bloomberg, as theose could also have an impact on bond pricing. We consider twenty-six different types of collateral and instrument types.
Our sample includes transactions related to government bailouts, and we account for these rescues in an attempt to isolate their effect on bond spreads. Bailouts are identified using SDC deal synopses, as well as reports from the press and company financial statements. We identify 215 bond observations (4% of our sample) from 25 firms related to bailouts for the full sample, with the bulk of these occurring during the 2008-2010 period (207 bond-years of 24 firms). We filter out these observations whenever performing regression analysis for the crisis period or employing a financial crisis binary variable.
Mean Differences Tests
Tests for differences in means are presented in Table 4 . The importance of the implicit government guarantee during times of financial distress is strongly significant in the univariate analysis. The univariate analysis does not control for a variety of important firm specific factors that influence the cost of debt and therefore does not offer insights into the direction of causality. However, it does suggest that government ownership leads to a reduction in cost of debt during times of economic distress, consistent with the increased value of an implicit government debt guarantee when default is, unconditionally, more likely.
Panel Regressions

Methodology
Multiple regression analyses test the effect of government investment on a target company's cost of debt, measured by its bonds' credit spreads. To control for heteroskedasticity and account for timeseries dependence, firm-clustered standard errors are also employed, as suggested by Petersen (2009).
Year fixed effects are also used in all regressions. Similar to Borisova and Megginson (2011) , the preliminary model is as follows:
where y it represents the credit spread, ς is an intercept term, β is a set of coefficients, X it is a matrix of explanatory variables, γ is a scalar coefficient, r it is the credit rating, v t (t = 1...18) represents the yearly fixed effects, and ε it is a classical error term. The indices i and t refer, respectively, to bonds and years,
All models in the analysis use an orthogonalized value of credit rating to control for the impact of other independent variables on its assigned value. Liu and Thakor (1984) 
Results
In Tables 5, 6 , and 7 we disaggregate government ownership into various categories and examine Table 7 ). The highest and most significant reduction in the cost of debt occurs for firms who receive investments from local/regional governments and SOEs. Table 5 shows that firms with local/regional government ownership achieve a 293 bp reduction in the cost of debt and those with SOE ownership finance their debt at a 73 bp discount, as compared to years without ownership by those government entities. Table 7 confirms that these effects are even stronger during the 2008-10 Crisis, as spreads for targets of local/regional government investments are 445 bp lower and targets of SOE investments enjoy a 124 bp reduction in the cost of debt during crisis times.
To gain a deeper understanding of what happens during times of financial distress, we add the financial crisis and the leverage interactions in Tables 8 and 9 , respectively. These interactions are created not only for the aggregate government presence variable but also for the various categories through which governments invest. While combined government presence does not show any significant influence on the cost of debt of target firms in Tables 5-7, Table 8 shows that it leads to a 125 bp reduction in the cost of debt compared to firms without state ownership during the 2008-2010 financial crisis. As expected, local government investments lead to a lower cost of debt in targets, and this effect is observed during the crisis as well. Echoing the result in Table 7 , central government ownership is again associated with a lower cost of debt for its target during the crisis (-135 bp, significant at the 5% level).
Table 8 also shows that pension fund ownership has a similar influence on the target's cost of debt during the financial crisis-a reduction of 57 bp-but is additionally linked to increased spreads (104 bp) for the rest of the sample period. These results confirm the importance of at the government implicit guarantee during times of financial uncertainty.
Government implicit state guarantees are valuable not only in the times of financial distress of the overall market, but also in the times of financial problems at a firm level. Table 9 shows that government presence leads to a greater reduction in the cost of debt of more highly-leveraged firms. The results are particularly notable for central government ownership, where the cost of debt for the target is higher on average by 143 bp but declines as leverage increases (a coefficient of -4.266, significant at the 1% level).
This inverse relation between state ownership and leverage also appears for aggregate government presence, as well as for SWF ownership.
In Table 10 we consider the size of government ownership stakes and its relation to the cost of Table 10 . Government ownership leads to a significant reduction of 1.8 bp in the cost of debt of high-yield bonds for every one percent increase in state ownership. Therefore, the implicit government guarantee can help provide cheaper financing for firms whose cost of access to capital markets is higher due to their leverage or credit rating level.
Robustness and Extensions
In the near future, we plan on including multiple robustness tests to verify our findings. First of all, we plan on using alternative data sources for bond identification and historical bond pricing data -in particular, Bloomberg -to increase the size of our sample and replicate the analysis included in the present with a larger number of observations. As a first robustness check, we plan to introduce a twostage model utilizing instrumental variables to control for the possible endogeneity of some of our control variables, in the spirit of Borisova and Megginson (2011) . This would allow us to control for possible selection biases in government investments.
Further, we plan to employ event-study methodology to investigate changes in the cost of debt of a firm around changes in government ownership. As is commonly done in financial research, we plan to identify an event date (the date on which a government or government-owned entity acquires or sells a stake in a target firm) and then compute cumulative abnormal returns for the target firm's bonds over various event windows (up to two years) following the transaction. In order to compute abnormal bond returns, for each bond in our sample, we will identify a value-weighted matching portfolio, compute abnormal returns, and then test the significance of those returns following the methodology described by Bessembinder, et al (2009) . This alternative econometric approach will allow us to verify that our results
are not driven by model misspecification.
In addition, we plan to check that our main findings hold also in several other settings--the market for Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), private (bank-originated) loans, and newly issued public loans. We will obtain CDS spreads from DataStream. CDS spreads can be interpreted as a market-based estimate of the cost of insuring the debt of a firm. As such, they constitute a very valid proxy for the market estimate of the risk of default of a firm's publicly traded debt; for example, a lower CDS spread is indicative of a lower perceived probability of default. Accordingly, we expect to observe any changes in the perceived risk of default of target firms to be reflected in changes in the associated CDS spreads. We will also collect data on private loans from DealLogic. Given the private nature of the data, we are only able to observe yields at issuance. Accordingly, any analysis based on DealLogic data will have to be confined to the sample of firms for which we have data both before and after an increase in government ownership (i.e., multiple private-loan issuances --at least one preceding the change in government ownership and at least one following the change). A similar approach will be used to evaluate issuance yields on new public loans for firms, with and without government ownership.
Aside from the above robustness checks, we are planning three extensions of our investigation.
First of all, we are interested in investigating whether the moral hazard and lack of monitoring associated with the implicit government guarantee affect managerial and firm operating performance. Accordingly, within an event study framework, we plan to investigate long-term changes in measures of operating performance. A preliminary list of variables in which we are interested includes return on assets (as a rough measure of firm profitability), Tobin's Q (as a proxy for managerial performance), and Altman's Zscore (as a measure of firm distress, an increase in which would be consistent with increased managerial risk-taking). As a second extension, we plan to examine whether the moral hazard induced by government ownership and the resulting increased managerial risk-taking leads to a value transfer between bondholders and shareholders of the target firm. Finally, we would like to further investigate the influence of different types of domestic and foreign governments on the cost of debt of the target firms.
Conclusions
Our research examines how government ownership affects firms' cost of debt. We find that the implicit guarantee imbedded in government investments is very important to bond investors and leads to a 
18
While we provide evidence as to the impact of government ownership on the cost of debt, we do not fully explore the different channels by which such an impact takes place. Accordingly, our analysis does not clearly identify whether such an increase in the cost of debt for the overall sample is due to either moral hazard, increased agency costs, or reduced profitability due to the imposition of non-valuemaximizing priorities-o to some combination of all three factors. A possible empirical methodology distinguishing between those would have to rely on more detailed analysis of operating performance metrics; we plan to extend the current study in this manner in the near future. 
Govt presence
Takes a value of 1 if the company currently has some government ownership, and 0 otherwise.
Govt ownership (%)
Percentage of the company owned by the government. Obtained from SDC, company financial reports and press. Fin. crisis Takes The time since the issue date, in days.
Maturity
The time till maturity, in days.
Euro
Takes a value of 1 if the bond issue is euro-denominated, and 0 otherwise.
Leverage (Total assets -Stockholders equity) / Stockholders equity
Market-to-book (Total shares * Closing share price) / Stockholders equity
Size
The natural log of total assets.
ROE
Net income / Stockholders equity
Bank Takes a value of 1 if the target company is a bank, and 0 otherwise.
Central govt
Takes the value of 1 if the investing entity is a central government, and 0 otherwise.
Govt financial institution
Takes the value of 1 if the investing entity is government-owned financial institution, and 0 otherwise.
Local/regional govt
Takes the value of 1 if the investing entity is a local or regional government, and 0 otherwise.
Pension fund
Takes the value of 1 if the investing entity is a government-owned public pension fund, and 0 otherwise.
SOE
Takes the value of 1 if the investing entity is a state owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise.
SWF
Takes the value of 1 if the investing entity is a sovereign wealth fund, and 0 otherwise. Year fixed effects (v t ) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: y it = α + θX it + γ ˆi t + v t + η it . The dependent variable, credit spread (y it ), is the difference between the corporate bond's current yield to maturity and that of the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and η it is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond's rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆi t ), are used. The explanatory variables included in X it are described in Table 2 . Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 2 . The data are annual. The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
(1) performed on the following model: y it = α + θX it + γ ˆi t + v t + η it . The dependent variable, credit spread (y it ), is the difference between the corporate bond's current yield to maturity and that of the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and η it is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond's rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆi t ), are used. The explanatory variables included in X it are described in Table 2 . Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 2 . The data are annual. The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
(1) Year fixed effects (v t ) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: y it = α + θX it + γ ˆi t + v t + η it . The dependent variable, credit spread (y it ), is the difference between the corporate bond's current yield to maturity and that of the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and η it is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond's rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆi t ), are used. The explanatory variables included in X it are described in Table 2 . Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 2 , and Fin. Crisis is interacted with each of the government owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
(1) Table 9 . Government ownership, the cost of debt, and firm leverage.
Year fixed effects (v t ) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: y it = α + θX it + γ ˆi t + v t + η it . The dependent variable, credit spread (y it ), is the difference between the corporate bond's current yield to maturity and that of the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and η it is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond's rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆi t ), are used. The explanatory variables included in X it are described in Table 2 . Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 2 , and Leverage is interacted with each of the government owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
(1) Table 10 . Types of government ownership stakes and the cost of debt.
Year fixed effects (v t ) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: y it = α + θX it + γ ˆi t + v t + η it . The dependent variable, credit spread (y it ), is the difference between the corporate bond's current yield to maturity and that of the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and η it is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond's rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆi t ), are used. The explanatory variables included in X it are described in Table 2 . Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 2 , and Leverage is interacted with each of the government owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Model 1 includes only firms with domestic government ownership, and Model 2 includes only firms with foreign government ownership. Model 3 contains only high-yield bonds rated BB+ or below by Standard and Poor's. Coefficients are listed below, with tstatistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
(1) Domestic (2) 
